Les extracto algunos párrafos sobre las conclusiones de la campaña:
Como ejemplo, veamos lo que ocurrió en Chateau Salins y Arrancourt .Historians and analysts have often critized yhe American commanders in the Lorraine campaign. One shortcoming that they have identified was a tedency toward overoptimism, criticized an understandable development given the great victories won in July and August and the information generated by Ultra. The successful conduct of the operational level of war requires the commander to look beyond the immediate battlefield and project himself forward in space and time, but this trait was carried to excess in Lorraine at the echelons above corps. From September to December, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton had their sights set firmly beyond the Rhine. Consequently, they underestimated the obstacles and opposition that their soldiers would have to overcome along the way. Thus, a difference in outlook arose between the higher commanders who drew large arrows on maps and the tactical units fighting for yards of muddy ground.
General Patton can also be faulted for neglecting to practice economy of force. We have noted several instances in which Third Army's forces were spread out on a broad front in an attempt to be strong everywhere with the result that they were decisively strong nowhere. In retrospect, the important battle in September was XII Corps' fight around Nancy, and in November, the main effort was XX Corps' assault against Metz. And yet Patton failed to concentrate Third Army's resources in reinforcement of the corps engaged in decisive operations. Furthermore, Patton never made an attempt to punch through the German defenses with divisions in column, even though he received approval for such an operation from his superior, LTG Bradley. One rule of thumb for mechanized forces that emerged from World War II was to march dispersed but concentrate to fight. In Lorraine, Third Army fought dispersed. (See Map 15.)
A similar criticism can be made of Patton's corps commanders. Walker and Eddy tended repeatedly to disperse their divisions and assign them missions beyond their means. We have seen several examples of important operations undertaken by divisions or parts of divisions without adequate planning or support, even though other forces could have been obtained to augment the effort by practicing economy of force. The corps commanders were trapped between Patton, who continually urged aggressive action, and the grim realities of terrain, weather, and a determined enemy. Perhaps it is not surprising that at times Walker and Eddy became preoccupied with local problems and lost sight of the broader issues. As a result, at the corps level the Lorraine campaign was a disjointed affair, with little cooperation between corps, and little continuity from one operation to the next. However, such operations as the tank battle leading to Arracourt and the 90th Division crossing of the Moselle at Koenigsmacker demonstrated that the American corps commanders were not incapable of applying force in a flexible and decisive manner.
The Lorraine campaign taught us some lessons in combined arms warfare. The tank and the airplane, two weapons which were commonly believed to have revolutionized warfare, were an unbeatable combination during the pursuit, leading up to Lorraine. But when the enemy dug in and the weather turned bad, infantry, artillery, and engineers reemerged as the dominant arms. The critical shortage of infantry fillers demonstrated that the American high command had failed to anticipate this development.
This campaign also demonstrated some of the drawbacks associated with the concept of a relatively light division reinforced by corps attachments. The triangular division embodied the characteristics of mobility and maneuver, but in Lorraine it was repeatedly employed in direct assaults against an emplaced enemy. The heavy casualties that occure in such operations were more than the triangular division could sustain, with the result that the entire division was often rendered virtually combat ineffective and had to be withdrawn from the line to rebuild. Perhaps the division, corps, and army commanders should be faulted for failing to utilize a greater degree of maneuver for which the triangular division was much better suited. The concept of plugging in temporary reinforcements from corps was seldom practiced as prescribed by doctrine. Instead, corps tended to assign combat and support elements to the division on a semipermanent basis, thus making up for some of the muscle that the triangular division lacked organically.
The American armored elements were not at their best in Lorraine either. Much of this can be attributed to the weather, but some of the blame must be given to the army commander for binding his armored divisions into infantry-heavy corps. Patton's reluctance to mass his armor came as a pleasant surprise to the Germans, who believed that their panzer divisions were just as useful in creating breakthroughs as they were in exploiting them. At a lower level, the combat command concept provided great tactical flexibility through decentralized control, but it also tempted Patton's corps commanders to break up the armored division and parcel it out by combat commands, a policy that further diluted Third Army's armored punch. Organizationally, the Armored Division of 1944 proved to be weak in infantry, a shortcoming often made good by detaching battalions from infantry divisions and assigning them to armored combat commands.
In addition, American tank crews repeatedly paid a heavy price for a doctrinal decision made before the war that declared tanks to be offensive weapons not intended for defensive combat against other tanks. As a result of this official policy, the M-4 Sherman tanks in Lorraine were badly outgunned by German panzers that mounted superb antitank pieces. The tank-stopping task was officially assigned to the tank destroyers, which were supposed to be thinly armored, highly mobile, heavily armed antitank specialists. Doctrine called for the majority of tank destroyers to be pooled in special corps and army antitank reserves, which could rush to the scene of an armored attack anywhere along the front. But Third Army didn't need an antitank reserve in Lorraine because German tanks usually appeared a few at a time. Consequently, the tank destroyer concept was discarded after the war, when the U.S. Army decided that the best weapon to stop a tank was another adequately armed tank.
Finally, the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be. In the August pursuit that brought Third Army to Lorraine, General Patton daringly violated tactical principles and conducted improvised operations with great success. He discovered, however, that the violation of logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter. Sooner or later, every improvisation and shortcut taken must be repaid. Third Army's logtstical shortcuts included burning up gasoline reserves to keep an advance going and then neglecting ammunition supply to bring up gasoline. The slowdown that affected all of the Allied forces in September and October was the inevitable price to be paid for gambling logistically that the war could be ended in August. Moreover, in spite of the logistical mobility afforded by motorization, remember that the trucks running the Red Ball Express consumed a greater and greater proportion of their cargoes as the advance progressed, forcing Third Army to turn to two time-honored methods of supply--railroad transport and local requisition.
El 16 de Setiembre Patton ordenó al XII cuerpo US ganar una cabeza de puente en el Rhin en el área de Darmstadt. Esto es lo que cabía esperar de un comandante de blindados que pensaba en grandes líneas y que entendía la forma de guerra con panzers. Sin embargo el XII perdió 2 días limpiando algunos grupúsculos de resistencia alemanes en Nancy lo que permitió concentrarse en Chateau Salins en I ejército alemán. El 18 y 19 el V PanzerArmee entró en combate en el área de Luneville ante la complicada situación del Moselle ( Manteuffel quería hacer mejor otra cosa que era un contraataque sobre la retaguardia americana); este contaba con la 15 PzGD, 111,112,113 PzBrigaden, 11PzD y 21PzD. Esto parece mucho pero la 11Pz estaba de camino y hecha añicos, igual que la 113 PzB, la 21 PzD eran unos cuantos infantes agotados y sin tanques igual que la 15PzGD y solo la 112 tenía un puñado de Panthers. Sin dar tiempo a concentrar todas las magras fuerzas disponibles Blaskowitz por orden de Adolfo ordenó el ataque sobre la marcha con todo lo que había sobre la 4 División americana blindada, sobre su flanco en Arrancourt. Los medios artilleros y aéreos americanos sellaron el conocido resulltado de casi 50 Panzers perdidos. No contentos con esto ordenaron a Manteuffel volver a atacar al día siguiente con lo que le quedaba ( 2 brigadas en la mínima expresión) con el resultado de una inferioridad que llevó a dichas unidades a establecerse en defensiva y al riesgo de una ruptura entre el I ejército y el 5 PzA. LLegó Balck en este desastre y ordenó ataques mantenidos para obtener la iniciativa , en Juwelize la 11 PzB quedó reducida a 7 tanques y menos de 100 hombres.
Nuevamente Adolfo ordenó atacar y la 106 PzB resultó la nueva víctima de los aviones como en el caso anterior a pesar de algún ésito inicial , pero lo que era claro para Balck es que los principios de la guerra acorazada no tenían aplicación posible con tal agresión aérea y tal superioridad artillera y de todo tipo del enemigo ( cuyos tanques eran inferiores a los alemanes). Adolfo ordenó atacar de nuevo con lo que tenía la 11 Pz ( 16 tanques) y lo que le quedaba a Manteuffel en el 58PzK, en total unos 50 Pz. El caso es que este ulterior ataque del brillante Hasso se vió favorecido por un malísimo tiempo para la aviación y logró una penetración cerca de Arrancourt, hasta el 29 de septiembre en que volvieron los aviones y sus consecuencias. Balck fué aver a Rundstedt y el viejo mariscal le dijo que estaba de acuerdo en que el grupo de ejércitos G no estaba en condiciones de seguir contraatacando por su inferioridad manifiesta.
Un último ataque en Gremecey hizo a Eddy retroceder con la furia consecuente de Patton que inhabilitó esas órdenes. Los alemanes tuvieron grandes pérdidas pero sus contraataques limitaron las opciones de un rápido éxito del ejército de Patton en cruzar el Rhin lo que vino ayudado por la orden de parar que Ike cursó el 22 de septiembre. todo esto lo cuenta v Mellenthin en su famoso libro y hace insistencia en el horror que en Manteuffel, Balck y él mismo produjo la situación de las tropas que tenían en sus manos; equipamiento ínfimo, soldados sin instrucción ni entrenamiento , incluso las unidades nuevas como las brigadas dotadas con los Panther tenían personal sin el menor rodaje mientras veteranas divisiones estabanc on tripulaciones expertas haciendo de infantería. Balck que era un optimista nato escribió deprimido a Jodl diciendo que no había visto en su vida un conjunto de tropas más lamentable que el que tenía que mandar contra la máquina militar americana. Entretanto se conoció la muerte de Rommel como consecuencia de heridas tras un ataque aéreo ( nadie sabía la verdad , especialmente Rundstedt que fué como representante dell führer al funeral).
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