Palabras de Rundstedt

La guerra en el oeste de Europa

Moderadores: José Luis, Audie Murphy

Responder
Avatar de Usuario
V.Manstein
Moderador Honorario
Moderador Honorario
Mensajes: 771
Registrado: Lun Jun 13, 2005 6:28 pm
Ubicación: Cantabria/Canarias

Palabras de Rundstedt

Mensaje por V.Manstein » Mar Dic 06, 2005 11:27 pm

Tras su captura los altos jefes del ejército alemán fueron objeto de numerosas entrevistas y muchos de ellos dedicaron años a la elaboración de documentos y reflexiones de todo tipo sobre la guerra a demanda de los americanos y británicos. De lo que consta que dijo Rundstedt algunas reflexiones son dignas de remarcar y quizás comentar:

Sobre lo de Normandía:
Had I been able to move the armored divisions which I had behind the coast, I am convinced that the invasion would not have succeeded."
"If I had been able to move the troops, then my air force would also have been in a position to attack hostile ships."

If he had had his way, Von Rundstedt indicated that the Allies would first of all have sustained prohibitive losses during landing operations. In addition, they would not have been able, "with relative impunity," to bring up battleships close to the coast to act as floating gun batteries.

"That is all a question of air force, air force, and again air force," he commented.

The Normandy invasion would have been "like Dieppe on a big scale"—Von Rundstedt believes—if he had been able to move his armored divisions as he desired. He summarized the situation with the statement:

"We would certainly have been better off if a good many things had been different as regards the distribution of forces."


Von Rundstedt claims that the Atlantic Wall was a "mere bluff," but admitted that the French coast was more heavily fortified from the Scheldt to the Seine. Pictured are German fortifications of the more imposing type.
"The enemy probably knew more about it than we did ourselves," Von Rundstedt said in referring to the so-called Atlantic Wall as a "mere bluff." He confessed that such a wall did exist from the Scheldt to the Seine, "but further than that—one has only to look at it for one's self in Normandy to see what rubbish it was."

According to Von Rundstedt, the wall consisted of a few pillboxes in holes in the sand so far apart that "you needed field glasses to see the next one." The only good thing was the fortresses, such as Cherbourg and Brest, but they were all fortified only toward the sea. He described the wall as "a dreary situation" south of the Gironde toward the Spanish border because "there was really nothing at all there."

All the ballyhoo about the Atlantic Wall was simply propaganda, Von Rundstedt said, but he admitted that people believed it—"at least we believed it." He thinks, however, that it was no mystery to the Allies because their air photography probably revealed the bluff.
Cita:
Von Rundstedt nevertheless severely criticized the mounting of the coastal guns. They were mounted as on ships, and could fire only out to sea. They were of no use to land forces because they could not fire in all directions


Sobre lo de Caen:
The defensive role played by the armored divisions near Caen during July and August was a great mistake." Von Rundstedt confessed, "but it was done on the orders of higher authority. We wanted to relieve the armored divisions by infantry, but it was impossible in the bulge in front of Caen where they were also under fire from ships' guns. You can't relieve any troops then."
Von Rundstedt's plan, which was turned down, was to withdraw the armored forces behind the Orne, form up the relieving infantry there, and then take away the tanks from in front and use them as mobile units to attack U.S. forces on the flanks. He was backed up by the senior tank commander, General Beyr von Schweppenburg, but to no avail. The armored divisions were left where they were "on the Führer's own orders."
Sobre la lucha en Italia y sus repercusiones sobre el devenir global de la guerra:

The situation immediately prior to the invasion of June 1944 was not good, Von Rundstedt said. He and his former Chief of Staff, General Blumentritt, recognized at least three basic weaknesses: their inadequate number of troops had to cover enormous stretches of coast line, some divisions as much as 35 to 40 miles; the Atlantic Wall was "anything but a wall, just a bit of cheap bluff"; and there was no counterattack reserve or so-called "Armee centrale," a strategic army under central command to counterattack where the invasion came.

Von Rundstedt, like many other German generals, said he did not control Germany's best troops. He complained that many of his best units were sent to Italy, and he asserted vigorously that it was "madness to continue the war in Italy that way."

After the collapse of Italy, "that frightful 'boot' of a country should have been evacuated. Mussolini should have been left where he was, and we should have held a decent front with a few divisions on the Alpine frontier. They should not have taken away the best divisions front me in the West in order to send them to Italy. That's my private view."
Sobre las Ardenas 1944:
For a far-reaching operation such as the Ardennes offensive, aimed first at the Maas and possibly still further, the forces were much, much, much too weak. The possibility of driving inland with armored divisions, with no GAF, was purely visionary. Reinforcements and supplies, with their railheads back on the Rhine, took longer and longer to move, and it was impossible to get them up. That offensive was bound to fail. There was no other possibility."
Fuente: Intelligence Bulletin March 1946 . ¿ algún comentario sobre los extractos citados?
Soldat im 20.Jahrhundert

Avatar de Usuario
José Luis
Administrador
Administrador
Mensajes: 9904
Registrado: Sab Jun 11, 2005 3:06 am
Ubicación: España

Mensaje por José Luis » Vie Feb 10, 2006 6:13 am

¡Hola, mon ami!

Je, je. A mí me hace gracia que el viejo (cariñosamente, eh) Rundstedt comentase posguerra lo que Rommel le había repetido hasta la saciedad antes del Día-D: que formar una reserva a retaguardia para desplegarla en un ataque de flanco una vez que el principal esfuerzo enemigo estuviera localizado era una estrategia completamente inútil e ineficaz porque el enemigo sería dueño absoluto de los cielos.

Si Rundstedt estuviera con Rommel en aquellos negros días del Desierto Occidental en el otoño de 1942, tal vez hubiera comprendido mucho mejor lo que Rommel le decía en los tiempos previos a la invasión aliada.

Saludos cordiales
José Luis
"Dioses, no me juzguéis como un dios
sino como un hombre
a quien ha destrozado el mar" (Plegaria fenicia)

Avatar de Usuario
fangio
Miembro distinguido
Miembro distinguido
Mensajes: 2340
Registrado: Sab Jun 18, 2005 1:33 pm
Ubicación: Argentina

Mensaje por fangio » Vie Feb 17, 2006 4:08 am

"If I had been able to move the troops, then my air force would also have been in a position to attack hostile ships."
¿Que la Luftwaffe hubiera estado en posición de atacar buques hostiles?
Con todo el respeto que me merece semejante Mariscal y siendo un absoluto principiante en cuanto a temas tácticos y estratégicos, pregunto:
¿con qué Luftwaffe?
No digo que los alemanes no tenían Fuerza Aérea para ese entonces pero ésta estaba muy disminuida. ¿Con qué le hubiese hecho frente por ejemplo a cientos y cientos de bombarderos que atacaban continuamente Normandía?

Estoy de acuerdo con lo que decía Rommel sobre hechar a los Aliados apenas desembarcaran y no dejarlos entrar en territorio pero siempre me surge la misma pregunta: ¿qué hubiesen hecho los alemanes con semejante poderío aéreo aliado? ¿podrían haber rechazado la invasión en Normandía?

Saludos,

FANGIO

Avatar de Usuario
ignasi
Miembro distinguido
Miembro distinguido
Mensajes: 1192
Registrado: Jue Jun 16, 2005 3:50 am
Ubicación: Barcelona, Catalunya

Mensaje por ignasi » Vie Feb 17, 2006 6:55 pm

Von Rundstedt nevertheless severely criticized the mounting of the coastal guns. They were mounted as on ships, and could fire only out to sea. They were of no use to land forces because they could not fire in all directions
Si, la verdad es que tras ver los cañones de Omaha Beach, que destrozo que hubieran podido causar si hubiesen podido disparar también sobre la playa...

Un saludo

Ignasi

Englishpilot
Usuario
Usuario
Mensajes: 12
Registrado: Vie May 02, 2008 11:02 pm
Ubicación: Venezuela
Contactar:

Mensaje por Englishpilot » Mié May 28, 2008 3:02 pm

Les recomiendo que vean la pelicula de un puente muy lejano, aunque quizas ya seguro la vieron pero alli se menciona mucho a este general y es buenisima..saludos!

Responder

Volver a “Frente occidental”

TEST