Dinámica doctrinal II. Un ejemplo práctico.

[V.Manstein]

La doctrina americana de destrucción de tanques tal como fue pergeñada fue un fracaso y no contemplaba verdaderamente los problemas prácticos reales del campo de batalla. Se asistió en el citado ejército a una auténtica dinámica doctrinal in situ en el campo de batalla, con particular éxito. La dinámica doctrinal antitanque en el ejército americano a su disposición:



http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/d ... gabel2.pdf

tank
destroyer doctrine was fundamentally flawed. It is the purpose of this paper to show that the creators of the tank destroyer concept formulated their
doctrine with an imperfect understanding of combined arms mechanized
warfare and thus created a doctrinal solution for a problem that did not
exist as perceived. Not surprisingly, field commanders who received tank
destroyer units refused to implement a doctrine that failed to account for
the realities of the World War II battlefield. The inflexibility of tank destroyer doctrine resulted in its abandonment and led to the employment oftank destroyers in extradoctrinal roles, albeit with a surprising degree of success. The flaws inherent in tank destroyer doctrine, rather than the misuse of tank destroyers by higher commanders or deficiencies in equipment, prevented the tank destroyers from fulfilling their intended role. That the tank destroyers performed yeoman service in spite of doctrinal defects is to
the credit of the American soldiers who, in essence, created a new doctrine in the field.