Doctrine for tank destroyer forces changed immensely during
the course of the war. Initially. doctrine called for tank
destroyers to be employed in mass, in pure formations, to halt
massed enemy armor. Units in the field quickly learned that tank
destroyers were most effective when dispersed and integrated into
combined arms teams.' Unlike the artillery, the tank destroyers
were an entirely new branch, one that did not exist in World War I.
Their doctrine, written just before U.S. entry in World War 11, had
never been battle-tested. It turned out to be based on a faultyperception of enemy tactics.
tank destroyers were supposed to counter never materialized,
because the Germans never employed their armor in this fashion.=
The massed all-tank attacks that the
Army Air Force doctrine for close air support also underwent
significant changes during the course of the war.
destroyer, close air support was something new: the Army had no
close air support doctrlne to speak of before World War II.= If we
look at close air support between 1945 and 1990, however, the
conclnuity of doctrine is just as striking as that of the artlllery
between 1918 and 1945. The system of forward air controllers, air
liaison officers, and air force cells in army headquarters has
remained much the same since 1945. Procedures for planned and
immediate air requests in the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars did not
change substantially from procedures used during the dash across
France in 1944, in spite of the tremendous technological advances
since World War 11.
Like the tank
Armor doctrine certainly changed between 1918 and 1940.
Tank forces participated in World War I , but only in an infantry
support role. Improvements in motor vehicle technology following
World gar I gave the tank greater mobility, protection, and
firepower, and inspired officers to elevate armor to the status of
an independent combat branch. The Army Ground Forces organized
armored divisions to conduct blitzkrieg-style warfare.
divisions would attack to punch a hole in the enemy lines, then the
armored divisions would rush through the gap and e~ploit nfantry
That was the theory, anyway. In practice, the U.S. Army
used its infantry and armored divisions almost interchangeably, and
tank employment retained many of the features of 1918. The
day-to-day mission of most U.S. Army tank battalions in Northwest
Europe was not blitzkrieg, but infantry support, just as it had
been in World War I. The majority of tank battalions were attached
to infantry divisions, where they provided mobile firepower and
protection.s The armored divisions made frontal assaults just like
the infantry divisions, and both infantry and armored divisions
were used in exploitation and pursuit. The successful armored
attacks of 1944-45 were really not very different from the British
tank attack at Cambrai in November, 1917. The British at Cambrai
used three brigades of heavy tanks, closely supported by infantry,
artillery, and aircraft to create a big hole in the German lines.*
This same combined arms ‘formula’ would remain the key to tactical
success in World War 11.
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... A22118.pdf
El texto anterior procede de una tésis de un oficial americano:
SIELD ARTILLERY DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT 1917-1945 by MAJ Scott R.